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This research examines existing leadership theories, doctrine, and practices to determine the appropriateness of institutional preparation and development (education and training) of future Joint leaders for holistic, systemic, problem management--preparation for strategic leadership. The research addresses the topic of strategic leadership to find out the extent to which leadership doctrine prepares senior leaders and their advisors for the distinct environment of policy formulation and strategy development, so one can better understand 1) strategic leader behavior, 2) the extent to which it is idiosyncratic, and 3) how the Design approach could facilitate strategic leadership.
It has become common to attribute the differences of strategic leader performance to idiosyncrasy--the personality of leaders and strategic advisors. Experience in l
The totality of the requirements for strategic leaders are not articulated as finite, but instead draw upon the multiple frameworks that one develops from experience, informed intuition, training, broad education, and refined judgment. While this descriptive doctrinal approach for strategic leadership is more appropriate for the ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty of the strategic environment, it does not highlight the discontinuity of leader development from direct and organizational levels.
eading the tasks of problem-solving does not naturally (organically) develop future leaders to meet the needs of strategic leadership. This monograph addresses the question: Does leadership doctrine adequately prepare future leaders of the Joint Force for strategic leadership?
iii 
INTRODUCTION
The great challenges of national security demand strategy to connect ends, ways, and means--to inform actions, allocate resources, and expose relationships between and among relevant stakeholders and the environment--to achieve national objectives. The security environment is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. 1 Strategic leadership is not merely the realm of problem-solving--particularly not mechanical or technical problem-solving--where a malfunction requires fixing to achieve or restore acceptable operation. Even analytical problem-solving pre-supposes that a larger problem can be decomposed into parts--solving the problems of the parts then ameliorates the problem of the whole. The mess of security problems are not inclined to be separated into their constituent parts for study, examination, or solutions.
It consists of political, social, economic, ethical, cultural, military, and technical conditions which must be considered and addressed if one aims to achieve a holistic outcome. Leading and making decisions in the national security environment requires an understanding of strategic leadership. 2 Jamshid Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity (Boston: Elsevier, 2006) , 126. Formulation of the Mess describes the challenge of defining complex problems. Russell Ackoff, "Systems, Messes, and Interactive Planning," in Redesigning the Future (New York/London: Wiley, 1974), 6 . "Every problem interacts with other problems and is therefore part of a set of interrelated problems, a system of problems…. I choose to call such a system a mess." The term "wicked problems" describes difficult or impossible problems with complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems.
The disparity of performance of strategic leaders requires exploration and explanation.
That which is not understood, is either discounted or relegated to a convenient category. It has become common to attribute the differences of strategic leader performance to idiosyncrasy--the personality of leaders and strategic advisors. This research addresses the topic of strategic leadership to find out the extent to which leadership doctrine prepares senior leaders and their advisors for the distinct environment of policy formulation and strategy development, so one can better understand 1) strategic leader behavior, 2) the extent to which it is idiosyncratic, and 3) how the Design approach could facilitate strategic leadership.
The doctrinal requirements for strategic leaders are not articulated as finite, but instead draw upon the multiple frameworks that one develops from experience, informed intuition, training, broad education, and refined judgment. While this descriptive doctrinal approach for strategic leadership may be more appropriate for the ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty of the strategic environment, it does not highlight the discontinuity of strategic leader development from direct and organizational levels. Making the cognitive leap to the challenges of strategic leadership is largely left to the individual leader and advisor.
As many officials describe their responsibilities, interactions, relationships, and products, they mention personality and idiosyncrasy that impacts the context of their jobs. The following statements are representative of what officials can be heard to say: "Personality always plays in meetings." "At best it is idiosyncratic at the national level." "There are big egos in the suite chairs." "Personality plays in all interaction." "It boils down to judgment/personality." "It is personality-driven leadership." "She did it by force of personality...we are all Type-As here."
The initial focus of this research was on decomposing the often-referenced personality and idiosyncrasy of senior leaders to construct a roadmap of personality traits that would facilitate objectivity by negating the impacts of idiosyncrasy. However, the existence of a few archetypes of personality, even intimate knowledge of them and the biases they influence, does not account for the variety of behaviors and attitudes that comprise the strategic context. 4 Looking at problems objectively (taking personality out) seems like a logical necessity to define a problem and devise solutions. The essence of problem-solving is to define the problem;
however, strategic leadership is not merely the realm of problem-solving. The challenge of military leadership doctrine is that it does focus on problem-solving. 7 This focus has utility in direct leadership and even organizational leadership--which accounts for 98 percent of military leaders. 8 "The paradox lies in that there is no natural harmony among technical, tactical, and operational experience [of problem-solving] and the context of strategy [and strategic leadership] ." 9 Reliance on mechanistic understanding is therefore doomed to fail.
The Design approach is a holistic approach to problem management. Leading the Design approach approximates effective strategic leadership. This research will examine existing leadership theories, doctrine, and practices to determine the appropriateness of institutional preparation and development (education, training, and experience) of future Joint leaders for holistic, systemic, problem management--which is preparation for strategic leadership. The big ideas of Design--learning, difference, systems, and social creation--lead to adaptation, which is necessary when dealing with networks and complex systems.
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The art and science of the operations process emphasizes the science at the tactical level, and to a lesser extent, at the operational level. Science is a factor at the strategic level; however, the art is predominant when concrete data gives way to an approach consisting of philosophy, ideology, sociology, psychology, and inter-personal relationships. The necessary wisdom at the strategic level is more art than science, and "artistry is an exercise of intelligence."
The Design approach can assist by effectively preparing strategic leaders to understand the distinct environment in which strategic leaders work and the special considerations required.
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BACKGROUND
The existing literature on leadership and management, strategy and policy, geopolitics, social sciences, and personality types is lively and relevant. The published works on Design and the emerging concepts and doctrine regarding the military application of Design allow the possibility that this research could identify knowledge gaps in the field. Earlier research and publication of a thesis on organizational leader development According to the Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Group, "doctrine is the fundamental principle that guides the operations and functions of the organization toward common goals and objectives." 32 The body of doctrine includes the documents that formalize an organization's strategy, policy, and procedures. These documents shape the work environment and organizational culture and codify authority, roles, and responsibilities. Doctrine provides a shared way of thinking about the problems faced by the organization, and provides the context and linkage between the top levels of the organization and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) required at implementation levels.
33
Both concepts and doctrine describe how an organization uses given capabilities in a set of circumstances to achieve a stated purpose "There is a close and complementary relationship between concepts and doctrine. In general terms, a concept contains a notion or statement that expresses how something might be done." 34 Concepts can explore new operational methods, organizational structures, and employment, while doctrine describes operations with extant capabilities, and is subject to current policy and constraints. Joint concepts provide the basis for joint experimentation; joint doctrine provides the basis for training and actual operations. Additionally, "leaders apply character, presence, intellect, and abilities to the core leader competencies while guiding others toward a common goal and mission accomplishment.
42
Leadership encompasses the selection, development, performance, and assessment of those individuals exercising authority in an organization. This description is adequate for direct and organizational leadership--which accounts for the vast majority of leader roles in the military.
Military officers are not brought into the service based on their potential for strategic leadership several decades into the future. Referring to the two principle roles for the strategic leader,
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"strategic leadership at the Army's highest level is significantly different in scope, effect, and execution than leadership at lower levels." 44 What is consistent among the levels of leadership is that "effective leadership is a function of the interaction of the leader, those being led or influenced (inside and outside of the organization) and the situation or circumstances facing the Strategic leaders apply additional knowledge, experience, techniques, and skills beyond those required by direct and organizational leaders. In the strategic environment of extreme complexity, ambiguity, and volatility, strategic leaders must think in multiple time periods and apply more adaptability and agility. 53 To merely focus on these doctrinal attributes and competencies as they apply to strategic leaders may prove unfulfilling. For this research to advocate that strategic leaders need more character, presence, and intellectual capacity, or that they must lead, develop, and achieve more than they did in direct and organizational leader roles, would ring hollow indeed. A more specific look at strategic leader roles, tasks, and functions is required.
54
Strategic Functions and Critical Tasks
The Army differentiates functions and tasks vertically. The Army executes thousands of functions and tasks in the institutional role to organize, train, and equip the force. These functions and tasks produce value-added outputs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Efficiency and effectiveness demand that each level perform essential and unique tasks or perform critical integrating functions. The three levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) are further divided into eight levels. The top (strategic) levels are shown in the chart. 54 The two principle roles of the strategic leader are 1) Leadership of the institution (the entire US Army) or at the combatant command level and 2) Military advisor to civilian authorities and participant in national strategy and policy formulation. 55 How the Army Runs, 26. objectives; integrate functions, and measure customer satisfaction. Level IV leaders work in the functions of program execution, meeting customer needs, implementing continuous improvement, and managing resources. Levels IV and V transform the strategic vision of Level VII leaders into a three to six-year framework within which subordinate organizations implement programs and training plans to create the conditions for successful activities at the tactical levels.
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The lower levels (Levels III, II, I--the tactical level) produce the products and services (direct outputs) consumed by the customer. For example, "the output of a service school is a trained Soldier. The output of a combined arms battalion is occupied and controlled territory."
62 Critical tasks at the tactical level are to increase productivity, ensure quality, eliminate waste, and apply lean principles. Aside from the function of producing direct outputs, the tactical level functions directly with customers; they manage to budget and implement continuous improvements. In a tactical command situation, the direction of work flow and its outputs are directed down to lower levels because that is where production occurs. It is at these lowest levels of leader activity where the plurality of leadership doctrine focuses attention. The institutional preparation and development through education, training, and experience produces leaders who become expert in tactical functions and tasks (Level I, II, and III), some small percentage learn the operational functions and tasks (Level IV and some V), and formal leadership doctrine is nearly silent on strategic functions and tasks (Levels, VI, VII, and VIII).
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Work fundamentally changes at the strategic level. Individuals doing work at the strategic levels produce outputs (services or products), but their outputs and work are directed at supporting a more senior Principal. The work at Level VI supports the outputs of Level VII.
The outputs might be data analyses (services) or reports (products). Level VI may also prescribe 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., 29. 63 This final sentence is the genesis of the title for this monograph "Practicing Strategic Leadership without a License." The gates and qualifications, certification and selection of leaders in tactical and operational levels (while not a licensing process) provides some assurance of adequate preparation. Potential success at the strategic level is not necessarily based on success at lower levels. The fact that much of this sounds alien to most military officers is evidence that preparation for strategic leadership is not widespread. Whether it is wide enough for the small numbers who will become strategic leaders or their advisors is a judgment best saved for later in this paper.
Strategic leaders create their work on a broad canvas that requires broad technical skills and mastery of strategic art. Broadly defined, strategic art is "the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the national interest."
65 Strategic leaders exert influence primarily through staffs and trusted subordinates and thus they "must develop strong skills in selecting and developing talented and capable leaders for critical duty positions."
66
Grand strategy is a nation's basic approach to political-military security. The policy and strategy apparatus for the security of the United States begins with the National Security System in which the "National Security Council advises and assists the President on national security and foreign policies and also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies." 67 Presidential Policy Directive 1 (PPD-1) established the National Security Council (NSC) structure for the Obama administration. given additional responsibilities; the COCOMs were given greater authority and responsibilities to execute their missions, and Services and OSD realigned specific responsibilities and made organizational changes to include some that involved greater civilian oversight and control.
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The primary political task of the policy process is to determine clear national strategic objectives--broadly expressed diplomatic, informational, military, and economic conditions that should exist at the conclusion of a campaign or operation.
These changes make the strategic environment require a high degree of Joint cooperation. The expanded requirement for leadership without authority negates some of the formative experience 71 JP 1, I-20. The supported CCDR must work closely with the civilian leadership to ensure a clearly defined national strategic end state is determined. Thinking of this "end state" as an integrated set of aims is useful because national strategic objectives usually are closely related rather than independent. The supported CCDR often will have a role in achieving more than one national strategic objective. Some national strategic objectives will be the primary responsibility of the supported CCDR, while others will require a more balanced use of all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in support of other agencies. the Joint Strategic Planning System which articulates guidance for the Joint Force, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) which provides specific direction to operational units, and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) which aligns resources for the services with particular functions and mission.
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According to the Army War College, the strategic leader role in this process is to be the master of the strategic art, which is defined as "the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action) and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests."
73
The strategic leader thus fulfills three overlapping roles: The strategic theorist develops strategic concepts and theories, integrates the elements of power, teaches the strategic art, and formulates the ends, ways, and means. The strategic leader provides vision and focus, masters inter-personal leadership skills, inspires others to think and act, and coordinates the ends, ways, and means. The strategic practitioner develops and executes strategic plans, employs force and other dimensions of national power, unifies activities through command and leadership skills, grasps all levels of war and strategy, and applies ends, ways, and means.
Strategic Environment
America's complex national security environment requires an in-depth knowledge of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, as well as the interrelationships among them. The strategic context includes "strategy, objectives, accountability, key stakeholders, priorities, constraints, and evaluation criteria." institutions, culture, values, and businesses, international laws, treaties, frameworks, and geopolitics, environmental conditions, social considerations, technical capabilities, and the entire informational domain impact the national level. Even when national security is not threatened, policy formulation and strategy development must account for resources, structure, systems, and processes that build and sustain the institution (hence the reason this research began with the Organizational Life Cycle Model). According to leadership doctrine, "leaders must not only know themselves and their own organizations, but also understand a host of different players, rules, and conditions." The simple admonition to know oneself and the organization at the strategic level demands that preparation for strategic leadership not be left to providence--a chance assignment, a particular mentor, or extensive reliance on self-development. 
The Design Approach
There is no shortage of problems in the world--natural disasters, hunger and famine, disease and resource insecurity, political unrest and war--to name but a few. The ability of man to cope with these problems is great indeed. The ability of man to solve these problems is flawed and misunderstood based on the simple definitions of solve and problem. A problem is "a situation that presents uncertainty, perplexity, or difficulty."
78 To solve is "to find the answer (as in the problem of a puzzle) or work out the solution (as in a mathematics problem)."
79
The Design approach is a holistic approach to problem management. If a problem cannot be solved, then problem management is determining actions to change conditions and adapting to the new conditions. Design is an approach "for critical and creative thinking that commanders use to understand the operational environment, make sense of complex problems, and develop broad approaches to resolve or manage those problems."
There is a finality to solving a puzzle--all the pieces fit into place, or solving a math problem, the answer is worked out. The best one can hope to achieve in social, political, economic, and ecological fields is transitory satisfaction with dynamic conditions--that is all, and conditions are not static. Man cannot solve all problems, but can act to change conditions (albeit perhaps temporarily) to a satisfactory state, or adapt to align with conditions (or a combination of acting to change conditions and adapting to the changes) to operate within a zone of tolerance. The seven fundamentals of Design are- Design requires the commander to lead adaptive work.
 Design is collaborative leadership and learning.
 The uniqueness of each situation requires creating shared understanding.
 Design requires questioning the limits of existing knowledge.
 Understanding is developed through hypothesis formulation and model construction.
 Hypothesis formulation and model construction require synthesis and evaluation.
 Establishing a broad approach to problem resolution is the main objective.
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81 Ibid., 3-1. The intellectual capacity attribute includes mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and domain knowledge. [2] [3] [4] 82 [3] [4] [5] Ibid., 3-4.
The Design Approach 84
The problem solver of the past needs to become the problem manager of the future, and a different approach is needed. Continued reliance on mere analysis and application of professional knowledge may prove adequate to conclude an ordinary career, but future strategic leaders of the Joint Force must develop new habits of thought for the challenges that lie ahead. Design offers an approach with the potential benefit of improved problem management.
The challenges for strategic leaders are a "mess" or "wicked problems"--complex environments with multiple, overlapping, and involved problems. Mechanistic understanding is doomed to failure as linear cause and effect is ambiguous in complicated, complex, and chaotic 85 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking, 131. contexts. 86 To achieve understanding requires iterative learning, a system to define the environment, identification of the problem (those intolerable conditions in the environment), and a broad operational approach to manage the problem and update learning. This is qualitatively different than executing a process of analysis to solve a given problem. One must acknowledge uncertainty and seek feedback through iteration--probe, learn, understand, and continually build a narrative of explanation to drive more learning. 90 [3] [4] [5] cannot explain behavior because the operational environment is inherently ill-defined and inconsistent. The behavior of the whole does not equal the sum of the parts. Synthesis and evaluation are therefore also critical for the study of the operational environment.
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To achieve synthesis in the approach of Design requires cognitive tension. Cognitive tension derives from differences in perspectives, theories, systems, and frames which generate creative tension and diversity. 92 The future Joint leader must regulate stress to maximize critical reasoning and creative thinking to achieve targeted generation of variety--"only variety can absorb variety," 93 The difference, creativity, and variety expose the paradoxes--which are the seeds of novelty. One must embrace uncertainty as the opportunity for change and seek novelty and emergence for their transformative potential. Through robust discourse, leaders can challenge traditional mental models and explore where adaptation can manage a problem and its undesirable conditions. 94 Unlike the analytical approach, the solution to a problem is unlikely this or that, but ratios of this and that--which is the essence of synthesis. One should not optimize for the middle, but address the systems of the environment and the assailable conditions of the problem.
95
The Design approach to inquiry about the world is systemic. The "mess" that future strategic leaders face is comprised of complex problems which require systemic response. Only from holistic understanding can one frame the relationships between and among the existing conditions and desired conditions. One must approach complexity by seeking explanations for 91 Ibid. 92 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking, [123] [124] Stafford Beer, The Intelligent Organization, Conference, Chapter 4 (Monterey, March 1990). The Law of Requisite Variety known as "Ashby's Law" after W. Ross Ashby who proposed it. "The variety in the control system must be equal to or larger than the variety of the perturbations in order to achieve control." system behavior and attempt actions in the operational environment or adaptation to facilitate action and transform the system.
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The Design approach is overly complex for a single individual and demands team effort.
Social creation is necessary to attempt shared understanding, manage group dynamics, and expose the challenge of appropriate leadership for adaptive work--consisting of open communications, facilitated discourse, and "activity to mobilize adaptation." 97 The strategic leader identifies the adaptive challenge, regulates tolerable stress, focuses on ripe issues, gives work to stakeholders, and protects the voices of leaders without authority.
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Defining the Problem
One must seek generators--tension, time constraints, divergent ideas, and gaps in learning to reap the benefits of the Design approach and promote creativity and generate novelty of ideas, concepts, potential activities and adaptation.
"If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend 59 minutes defining the problem and one minute resolving it."
Albert Einstein
99
According to Army leadership doctrine, "critical thinking implies examining a problem in depth, from multiple points of view, and not settling for the first answer that comes to mind." 100 96 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking, 131-137. Chapter 6 on Formulating the Mess talks about defining problems and systems thinking. Misconceptions about reality obscure the real problem because of mental models, assumptions, and images. Without a process of inquiry, the temptation is to solve the apparent problem which fits an existing model, assumption, or image of reality.
Leadership doctrine appropriately identifies intellectual capacity as a required attribute.
However, the following passage still implies that a robust intellect can discern a solution--which 100 resonates with the language of problem-solving. Likewise, it advocates sorting through distractions to isolate the main problem--which suggests analytical processes.
Army leaders need this ability [critical thinking] because many of the choices they face require more than one solution. The first and most important step in finding an appropriate solution is to isolate the main problem. Sometimes determining the real problem presents a huge hurdle; at other times, one has to sort through distracting multiple problems to get to the real issue.
101
Particularly at the strategic level, the complexity of multiple interdependent variables and the multi-minded system of the strategic environment precludes traditional analysis and the appropriateness of a discrete solution. Although it is always important to consider how to solve current problems better, that in itself is not a sufficient basis for assessing approaches to complex problems. No formula exists for resolving the choice among competing solutions.
Each problem requires individually-tailored solutions. FM 5-0 advocates the focus on effectiveness by stating that "the choice depends on how commanders apply sound judgment to 102 Gharajedaghi, Systems Thinking, 9. The nature of organizations range from a mindless system (mechanical model), to an unminded system (biological model), to a multiminded system (social model). Approaches to deal with those systems range from simple, analytical approach (independent variables), to the systems approach (interdependent variables).
103 their situational understanding. Design provides an approach for leading adaptive work from which a complex, ill-defined situation can be made sense of and acted upon effectively."
104
For strategic leaders, effectiveness (ameliorating the conditions of the right problem) must take precedence. Increased productivity (efficiency) is a tactical level task. Managing resources and integrating functions and cross-functions are operational level tasks. These lower levels can and will execute appropriate leadership and planning to accomplish the mission assigned to them. Strategic leaders (and their advisors) must define the mission and context (which are Level VI and VII strategic tasks). Selfawareness is the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes to the environment; assess against that environment to determine 115 Ibid., 10-8. leadership foresees changes to the environment and brings organizations through adaptation to the environment.
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ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION
122
Strategic leaders have to apply both leadership and management since they must cope with change and complexity. They must be "experts in their own fields of warfighting and leading large organizations, and have to be comfortable in the departmental and political environments of the Nation's decision making." 123 Strategic leaders best deal with complexity by embracing it. This means they expand their frame of reference to fit a situation rather than reducing a situation to fit their preconceptions. Demonstrating the agility required to handle competing demands, strategic leaders understand complex cause-and-effect relationships and anticipate the second-and third-order effects of their decisions throughout the organization.
124
They must maintain a clear idea of the national command's perspective and also use tact to justify standing firm on nonnegotiable points while communicating respect for other participants in policy formulation and strategy development.
125
As at all levels of leadership, ethics and communication are critical elements of effective leadership. Being a participant at the national-level also mean leading without authority.
Leading without authority requires adaptation to the environment and cultural sensitivities of the given situation. This research addressed the topic of strategic leadership to find out the extent to which leadership doctrine prepares senior leaders and their advisors for the distinct environment of policy formulation and strategy development, so one can better understand 1) strategic leader behavior, 2) the extent to which it is idiosyncratic, and 3) how the Design approach could facilitate strategic leadership. With this understanding, one can answer the question: Does leadership doctrine adequately prepare future leaders of the Joint Force for strategic leadership?
The answer to this question has direct applicability to a very small minority of the Joint Force--those who will someday become strategic leaders or their advisors. However, the vision and direction of strategic leaders set structure, systems, processes, missions, values, culture, resourcing, alignment, policy and strategy--which build and sustain institutions and perpetuate the profession.
Leadership doctrine, particularly for strategic leadership, is neither dogmatic nor prescriptive. Current leadership doctrine has also limited the penchant towards exhaustive lists of attributes, skills, and actions. While the lists of competencies and attributes still exist in doctrine, they are principally focused on development in junior and mid-grade levels. The totality of the requirements for strategic leaders are not articulated as finite, but instead draw upon the multiple frameworks that one develops from experience, informed intuition, training, broad education, and refined judgment. While this descriptive doctrinal approach for strategic leadership is more 128 Ibid., 188. 129 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "From Hope to Audacity" in Foreign Affairs, (Jan/Feb 2010), 30.
appropriate for the ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty of the strategic environment, it does not highlight the discontinuity of leader development from direct and organizational levels.
Subordinate leaders, intimately aware of the command and control structure that surrounds them, evaluate strategic leadership challenges in the frameworks with which they are familiar. The simplistic example is a currently serving direct or organizational leader attempting to analyze a strategic leader decision. The global, regional, national, and societal perspective and context of the decision does not resonate outside the strategic realm. Understanding strategic leader behavior becomes a matter of perspective and context. Preparation and development to work in those contexts is arguably a role for doctrine. Doctrine describes the challenges of longterm perspective, multi-order effects, large organizations, leading without authority, complexity, and ambiguity, but specific development is relegated to meta-competencies, self-development, and judgment.
The extent to which strategic leader behavior is idiosyncratic, is a testament to the fact that there is no cookie-cutter approach to development nor a definitive recipe for strategic leader success. Personality matters because "conflicts invariably involve personalities: leadership matters."
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The common attributes of physical, mental, emotional and spiritual fitness apply to all healthy human beings. The technical and tactical skills of the strategic leader inform the context Strategic leaders must develop (and the plurality of development at this level is selfdevelopment) to operate, influence, and improve in the context described by doctrine and adapt to the relevant specific context in situ. Psychological types indicate preferences for cognition and behavior, but they are not deterministic. The social context and personalities of decision-making entities are part of the relationships and interactions which influence outcomes. Personality does not account for attempts to execute problem-solving when analysis is wholly inappropriate; nor does it explain success when intellect and creativity deserve proper credit.
but become less relevant. Interpersonal skills will always remain a relevant part of leadership since the interaction with those being led or influenced (inside and outside the organization) and the circumstances of that interaction prevail at all levels.
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Managing problems is a better description of strategic leader work than problem-solving.
The opportunity and penchant to approach a "mess" of problems with a learning attitude, prepared to adapt with a broad approach to managing intolerable conditions in a complex system is one thing offered by the Design approach. According to FM 5-0, commanders "use Design if the problem is complex and if they do not inherently have the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and resources to generate full understanding of the circumstances needed to guide operations.
However, given the complexity of global and regional operations, the higher the command echelon, the greater the need for Design." Conceptual skills at the strategic level may dominate. Critical and creative thinking are required at varying intensities while developing as a direct leader and as an organizational leader. To transition to strategic leadership (or knowledgeably advise a strategic leader) requires clear thinking, an appropriately robust intellect, creativity, and cognitive skills that enable broad approaches to manage messy problems.
132 Many leaders ask for condensed information, which may be inappropriate for other than simple contexts. Advisors (ostensibly future senior leaders) have been conditioned to provide condensed information and avoid the "thick description"
narrative which provides meaning and context and recognizes bias. 133 The need for analysis at lower levels has to be replaced with a need for synthesis as "a complex problem is a problem caused by conditions that are interlocking and interdependent, meaning that the conditions must be understood as an integrated whole." Many ideas should be treated as gestalts--integrated phenomena not derivable by summation of parts--treated in totality, complexity, and dynamics.
An advisor, ignorant of strategic context, may provide condensed information in a 132 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973) , 3. 134 problem-solving, analytical sense, to the detriment of the adaptive challenge and appropriate context. Consistent with the challenges of an organization, solutions cannot be quick-fix or locally rectified. The doctrine for strategic leadership represents both a follow-on from leader development for direct leadership and organizational leadership, as well as a quantum leap forward requiring new, unique and exceptional qualities that are not guaranteed to develop organically among even the most successful leaders at lower levels.
When the preparation for strategic leadership is relegated to the individual, it is no wonder that idiosyncrasy becomes the explanation for differences in style and results. Even before the advent of Design, "knowledgeable commanders have intuitively developed designs to frame problems. Problem framing permitted staffs to produce plans using the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to achieve the commander's intent. Yet a danger exists in assuming that commanders can always intuitively develop an effective Design concept."
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Final Thoughts
Pursuit of a unified theory--in absolute form--proves problematic in social endeavors.
Leadership is conceptual, technical, and interpersonal which suggests it cannot be completely independent of personality and sociology. Warfare is a product of society--the demos--and requires an understanding of social aspects. There are arguably as many styles of leadership as there are leaders practicing their craft. The perspective and context of strategic leadership has all the trappings of human interaction, the nuance of working alongside the political apparatus of the nation, and the ambiguity, volatility, uncertainty, and complexity of the strategic environment, and the challenges of relying on informed judgment when there is no solution to a problem that one can only hope to manage to a dynamically satisfactory condition.
135 Ibid., 3-2.
